Autocrats commonly use legalized repression, where ordinary courts are involved in prosecuting the opposition or ordinary citizens. Yet we do not know whether judges actually receive any benefits from partaking in politically motivated trials. I test this proposition using data from modern Russia, where repression is widespread and commonly used (McCarthy et al., 2023; Tertytchnaya, 2023). I focus on district courts judges in Moscow, from 2000 until 2022. Moscow in itself is a federal district; and provides enough variation among district courts, judges, and types of cases entering the system. Using a dataset on politically motivated criminal and administrative cases from OVD-Info and Memorial NGO with self-collected dataset on biographies of judges and their financial disclosures, I examine whether judges receive a promotion or material gains shortly before or after deciding a politically motivated case. With this study, I aim to contribute to our knowledge of bureaucracy in authoritarian regimes and to highlight the role individuals play in political repression. By focusing on district court judges, I will examine the role of ordinary courts, thereby shifting focus from studies on higher/constitutional courts. My focus on Russian judges will fill the gap by providing empirical evidence of the role of ordinary judges in everyday repression and the incentives underlying their decisions.