Environmental protection and climate change mitigation rely heavily on companies fulfilling their pledges to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and air pollutants. However, research suggests that such pledges often serve as "greenwashing" strategies with limited impact. This raises the question: under what conditions do firms meaningfully reduce industrial emissions? We argue that firms are more likely to reduce emissions when GHG abatement can serve as political leverage due to its visible and localized benefits. We focus on lobbying relationships with elected representatives and argue that firms strategically focus emission reductions in the constituencies of their lobbying targets. This allows local representatives to claim credit for environmental improvements, aligning with their electoral interests. Similar to job creation in local economic development, firms trade concentrated emission reductions for favorable regulatory outcomes. We support our argument with two separate analyses of geo-referenced data on industrial emissions and lobbying activities in the US and Brazil (2010–2023). Findings reveal that firms significantly reduce emissions in facilities located within the constituencies of their lobbied representatives, particularly for pollutants like methane (CH4) and hydrofluorocarbons that heavily impact air quality. The effect is driven by lobbying relationships with incumbent politicians running for re-election and becomes stronger as elections approach. These results advance our understanding of corporate environmental behavior, climate lobbying, and the geographical dynamics of the political economy of emissions. By highlighting the political conditions under which firms implement emission reductions, we shed light on the interplay between corporate strategies and environmental outcomes.