This study examines cycles of nepotism in public procurement in developing democracies. We argue that electoral incentives create perverse pressures for corruption, leading incumbents to favor politically connected firms in awarding public procurement contracts in exchange for kickbacks. This favoritism intensifies in the run-up to elections, when both the demand for campaign funds and public scrutiny peak. Politicians strategically allocate contracts for harder-to-monitor projects, thereby evading public and media oversight. Using data from the Philippines (2004–2019) and a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design, we demonstrate that politically connected firms are disproportionately favored for difficult-to-monitor contracts, such as infrastructure projects. Detailed audit data further reveal that projects awarded to these firms are of lower quality. In contrast, these firms are less likely to secure contracts for high-scrutiny projects, such as schools and health facilities. This study advances our understanding of how electoral incentives and political connections interact to undermine public procurement processes. It highlights the significant welfare costs of these dynamics and offers policy insights to mitigate corruption in developing democracies.