Building Fiscal Capacity with Traditional Political Institutions:
Experimental and Qualitative Evidence from Sierra Leone
P8-S195-3
Presented by: Kevin Grieco
I argue that governments in weak states can build fiscal capacity by collaborating with nonstate,
traditional political institutions (TPIs). To study the impact of collaboration, I partnered
with the local government in Kono District, Sierra Leone (the KDC), and embedded an experiment
within their awareness campaign for a new rural property tax. Property owners in
118 villages were shown videos with varying content. Those in the treatment group viewed
an additional segment where their paramount chief discussed the collaboration between the
chiefdom government and the KDC in the tax effort. Priming collaboration significantly increased
tax compliance and strengthened property owners’ belief in their obligation to pay
taxes. To assess mechanisms, I developed additional video segments where paramount chiefs
emphasized either their coercive capacity or their accountability to constituents. The experimental
findings, reinforced by qualitative evidence from 300 interviews, demonstrate that both
coercion and accountability are crucial sources of TPIs’ authority.
traditional political institutions (TPIs). To study the impact of collaboration, I partnered
with the local government in Kono District, Sierra Leone (the KDC), and embedded an experiment
within their awareness campaign for a new rural property tax. Property owners in
118 villages were shown videos with varying content. Those in the treatment group viewed
an additional segment where their paramount chief discussed the collaboration between the
chiefdom government and the KDC in the tax effort. Priming collaboration significantly increased
tax compliance and strengthened property owners’ belief in their obligation to pay
taxes. To assess mechanisms, I developed additional video segments where paramount chiefs
emphasized either their coercive capacity or their accountability to constituents. The experimental
findings, reinforced by qualitative evidence from 300 interviews, demonstrate that both
coercion and accountability are crucial sources of TPIs’ authority.
Keywords: fiscal capacity, traditional political institutions, Sierra Leone, tax compliance