A core function of international organizations (IOs) is to provide information to governments, non-state actors, and voters by publishing written reports. These reports are typically authored by IO staff, but member governments are often involved in the report production as well. Across many issue areas—from human rights and economic relations to environmental governance—states often submit comments on draft versions of report text, similarly to academic peer review. Focusing on governments as reviewers in climate cooperation, we build on the principal-agent theory and argue that IO staff can exercise the greatest control over the report text when multiple governments comment on the same sentence but ask for opposing changes; when government comments are aligned, instead, IO staff are more likely to accept the requested changes. We test these expectations by studying more than 4,000 government comments to the “Summary for Policymakers” of Working Group III on mitigation options of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). By locating individual comments to particular sentences of IPCC draft text and by using country covariates to measure topic-specific government alignment, we demonstrate that IO staff discretion at the sentence level as unit-of-analysis decreases as government comments become more aligned. These findings have important implications for existing research on informal governance in IOs and they challenge conventional assumptions that IO information is free from government influence and national interests.