Pork-barrel politics is often criticized as inefficient, unaccountable, and stagnant. However, its inherent stability can counter efforts to undermine democratic institutions. Pork-barrel politicians, reliant on electoral systems for their survival, have a vested interest in preserving these systems, unlike programmatic politicians who may be more susceptible to co-optation by authoritarian forces.

This study examines the role of legislators during the final phase of army-led democratic backsliding in Japan (1940–1945). Using digitized records from the 75th to 85th legislatures of the Imperial Diet, I categorized proposals, motions, petitions, and questions as sector-specific, constituency-specific, or programmatic. Legislative minutes were analyzed to measure comment frequency and speech length on pork-barrel and programmatic topics, providing insights into legislators’ priorities (pork-barrel vs. programmatic politics) and productivity (total output). The Imperial Diet’s partially lottery-based committee assignment system was employed as an instrumental variable to identify opportunities for pork-barrel politics. Election results from 1937 and 1942 were also digitized and analyzed.

The findings indicate that pork-barrel politicians were (1) less likely to align with the army, (2) more likely to run as independents in the 1942 election, (3) more likely to increase their vote share in 1942 compared to 1937, even amidst a pro-army wave, and (4) less likely to attain cabinet positions. Additionally, a case study illustrates how the army co-opted Socialist legislators by adopting their policies.

In fragile and unstable democracies, pork-barrel politics may act as a stabilizing force, enabling politicians to maintain independent stances without fear of severe electoral repercussions.