Redistributive movements often advocate policies aimed at reducing inequality, but these groups can receive support from some members of the economic elite. What drives elite support for redistributive movements? An underlying distributive conflict requires members of the elite to choose between supporting the incumbent and risking total expropriation if the incumbent loses, or supporting the redistributive political movement and gaining political influence over the redistributive policies implemented by a successor government. In such contexts, elites dissatisfied with current economic policies—who derive little utility from the regime's survival—will find it more appealing to support the redistributive movement. In this project, we examine the determinants of landed elite support for revolutionary movements in the context of the Mexican Revolution. We use trade shocks caused by Mexico’s integration into the global economy as an exogenous source of landed elite dissatisfaction with pre-revolutionary economic policies. We argue that landed elites who were negatively affected by international competition were more likely to support the Mexican Revolution. In addition, we examine whether municipalities with a revolutionary landowner, i.e., a landowner who supported the revolutionary forces, have lower levels of land reform in the post-revolutionary period than comparable municipalities without a revolutionary landowner.