Voters’ expectations about election outcomes are a key factor in shaping electoral behavior, especially when voting strategically. However, previous research shows that citizens’ expectations are often biased through wishful thinking. Additionally, not all voters are equally skilled at forming accurate expectations. Based on a survey experiment this study investigates whether offering monetary incentives for accurate expectations can reduce bias and increase the accuracy of voters’ expectations. It also examines how this effect varies across different groups of voters. For this, the study uses original survey data from the 2025 German federal election and a second-order state election in 2024. By combining first-past-the-post districts with proportional representation, Germany’s electoral system provides a valuable setting to analyze voter expectations in different electoral contexts. The survey includes eliciting voters’ expectations on the district winner, parties’ vote shares, whether a party will be represented in parliament and who will become chancellor. In a survey experimental set-up, a random subset of respondents is informed that the most accurate expectations will be financially rewarded. Regression models are utilized to test whether monetary incentives lead to more accurate and objective expectations and how this affects citizens differently. The findings will shed light on how voters form expectations about elections and whether financial incentives can improve their accuracy. Additionally, the study explores which groups of voters benefit most from such incentives.