Can material benefits distributed during an autocratic regime explain the post-transitional success of mainstream parties with links to the former regime? Very little is known about the impact different characteristics of previous undemocratic regimes have on post-transitional democracies. If autocratic legacies have been extensively studied from an ideological standpoint (e.g. how ideology shapes attitudes towards policy and voting preferences), in this article, I provide an innovative political economy approach to legacies of autocratic regimes.

Using archival evidence collected at the province-level for Franco’s dictatorship in Spain (1939-1975), I show that the “self-interested” relationship between the general population and autocratic incumbents, operating through a top-down logic of reception of material benefits provided by autocratic policies, is crucial in shaping post-transitional attitudes towards the regime, policies and voting preferences. This article empirically demonstrates that when an autocracy produces policy outputs resulting in welfare improvements that are large and widespread among the general population, after transitions to democracy — which constitutes a situation of high uncertainty —, rational voters are motivated to vote for parties that, by aligning themselves with the past regimes in order to exploit its competence, would offer to maintain the benefits delivered during the regime.

The economic growth brought about by the modernization process that took place in Spain during the second-half of the regime (“Spanish Economic Miracle”), explains the post-transitional electoral success of right-wing parties associated with the past dictatorship. Areas with greater quality of life improvements, indicated by GDP per capita, showed higher voting rates for these parties.