Democratic backsliding is often associated with the erosion of judicial independence. One mechanism is the rise of special jurisdictions, such as military or political courts, which are designed to enforce social order and challenge the authority of regular legal systems. This paper argues that authoritarian-leaning executives appoint "law-and-order" judges to these special jurisdictions and that the establishment of such courts can influence judicial behavior more broadly. This paper examines the hypotheses in the case of Hong Kong, a special administrative unit of China. In response to social movements, the central government imposed a national security law in 2020, creating a specialized judicial jurisdiction with a subgroup of judges designated to handle these cases. Using LLM-assisted text classification on 24,868 ordinary criminal cases decided between 2010 and 2024, this paper finds that executives selected judges who exhibited stricter stances on order and crime for national security cases. However, differences in sentencing behavior between national security and ordinary judges decreased after the establishment of the special jurisdiction, suggesting a spillover effect on the broader judiciary.