This work will contribute to understanding the causal relationship between the design of electoral institutions and their efficiency in upholding their democratic purpose when subjected to endogenous challenges. Given the profound cultural and socioeconomic differences between North America and Latin America, comparing their political systems has been challenging for academics. However, Brazil and the US currently offer a unique opportunity to carry out such comparative analysis. On the one hand they are both prominent federalist democracies that recently experienced democratic undermining under populist leaders, and on the other hand they faced such challenges with distinct institutional frameworks. Akin to an engineer evaluating the endurance of two skycrappers after an earthquake, this study evaluates the different mechanisms that allowed these “'political skyscrapers” systems to maintain democratic integrity (equilibrium) under stress.
Through a case study comparative approach, I will determine which characteristics of their electoral governance models facilitated their institutional equilibrium to be altered. By establishing the causal relationship between electoral governance models and democratic resilience, this work will advance the following hypothesis: Brazil demonstrated an easier realignment to its established political norms and practices (resilience), at least partly attributed to specific mechanisms designed to prevent partisan intervention. In contrast, the US exhibited a more prolonged disruption from its institutional equilibrium, which was explained by the misalignment of a politized system that was resistant to change.