Public services are consistently ranked among the most significant factors influencing citizens’ evaluations of government performance. However, the scholarship on whether electoral accountability is enforced for public service delivery remains unclear in the context of low- and middle-income democracies. This paper examines the mechanisms linking public service provision to electoral accountability through the case of the Delhi state government, which has been re-elected three times on a platform prioritising public services.

Drawing on original survey, experimental and ethnographic data collected during 18 months of fieldwork, the study reveals that while public service provision is significantly associated with government performance, the credit for implementing public service delivery primarily accrues to the party leadership rather than local representatives. While voters consider the overarching agenda and policy promises when evaluating party performance, local electoral accountability operates on a different rationale: The past records of an individual elected official's policy implementation play a minor role in voters’ decisions regarding their reelection. Instead, voters prioritise candidates willing and capable of effectively addressing and resolving citizens’ immediate concerns.

This study advances our understanding of electoral accountability by disentangling voters’ perceptions of a party's policy agenda from their views on elected officials' constituency service. It highlights that, while public service provision informs government performance at a policy level, the selection of local officials does not adhere to programmatic criteria. Instead of choosing policy implementors, voters prefer officials who can act as mediators to the local state.