What Motivates Young People to Support the Far Right? Evidence from Survey Experiments in France, Germany, and Italy
P6-S148-4
Presented by: Kevin Arceneaux
What makes young voters support the far right? While surveys across Europe indicate
a surge in far-right support among the youth (Faiola & Fernandes Martins, 2024), little is
known about the causes of that surge. Popular explanations tend to emphasize the economic grievances of the young people (Henley & Sauer, 2023), drawing on the more general research on economic insecurity fueling the radical right. However, those theories have not yet been put to a causal test on young voters.
A rich body of literature contributed to explaining the emergence of far-right populism
(e.g., Berman, 2021; Margalit et al., Nd; etc.) Theories of far-right voting boom tend to pit cultural explanations (e.g., Mutz, 2018) against economic ones (e.g., Cavaillé and Ferwerda, 2023). While some recent contributions combine two explanations (e.g., Cremaschi, Bariletto, & De Vries, 2023; Rhodes-Purdy et al., 2021), these frameworks do not consider whether economic or cultural mechanisms work similarly for different social groups.
In this study, we aim to test theories of support for the far-right on a sample with a large proportion of young voters using a survey experiment, which provides extra leverage of causal identification. The research employs a two-wave online survey targeting approximately 6,000 respondents in France, Germany, and Italy during the 2024 European elections, with a focus on young people (under 35). The survey experiment uses a series of vignettes to examine preregistered hypotheses regarding the effects of economic insecurity, immigration, and cultural discontent on political attitudes.
a surge in far-right support among the youth (Faiola & Fernandes Martins, 2024), little is
known about the causes of that surge. Popular explanations tend to emphasize the economic grievances of the young people (Henley & Sauer, 2023), drawing on the more general research on economic insecurity fueling the radical right. However, those theories have not yet been put to a causal test on young voters.
A rich body of literature contributed to explaining the emergence of far-right populism
(e.g., Berman, 2021; Margalit et al., Nd; etc.) Theories of far-right voting boom tend to pit cultural explanations (e.g., Mutz, 2018) against economic ones (e.g., Cavaillé and Ferwerda, 2023). While some recent contributions combine two explanations (e.g., Cremaschi, Bariletto, & De Vries, 2023; Rhodes-Purdy et al., 2021), these frameworks do not consider whether economic or cultural mechanisms work similarly for different social groups.
In this study, we aim to test theories of support for the far-right on a sample with a large proportion of young voters using a survey experiment, which provides extra leverage of causal identification. The research employs a two-wave online survey targeting approximately 6,000 respondents in France, Germany, and Italy during the 2024 European elections, with a focus on young people (under 35). The survey experiment uses a series of vignettes to examine preregistered hypotheses regarding the effects of economic insecurity, immigration, and cultural discontent on political attitudes.
Keywords: populism, youth, far-right, voting, Europe
