Executive decrees and the Public Opinion: Exploring the Demand Side of Unilateralism
P6-S146-3
Presented by: Umberto Platini
This study examines how voters respond to the issuance executive decrees, focusing on how public perceptions inform the legislative strategy of cabinets in Italy. Using a formal model and a two-part survey-based approach, we combine a conjoint analysis with a single-blind experiment to explore how respondents evaluate legislative drafts based on the legislative procedure employed. In particular, executive action decreases the support by around 10%. Political affiliation and legislative content further influence public evaluations. While the use of decrees does not directly enhance satisfaction with the government’s performance, it does shape perceptions of governmental efficiency and responsiveness. The research underscores the strategic use of decrees to frame issues as urgent, raising concerns about the potential balance shift from the legislative branch in favor of the executive. The findings offer insights relevant to legislative dynamics in parliamentary systems but also to a larger research agenda concerned with democratic backsliding in mature democracies.
Keywords: legislative strategy, suvery experiment, executive action, democratic backsliding, political communication