Since the end of the Cold War, authoritarian regimes have undergone significant transformations to adapt to the new international dynamics and become more resilient to the increasing democratization pressures. As part of this process, they are increasingly adopting digital surveillance systems as an efficient information-gathering mechanism to further control the population. However, little is known about the impact of these systems on opposition dynamics and state repression. Drawing from formal models of authoritarian politics and information theory, this paper examines how digital surveillance systems affect protests and repression in electoral autocracies. This paper argues that digital surveillance systems substantially reduce the costs of repression, as they allow dictators to monitor and target dissenting citizens. This, in turn, substantially increases citizens’ costs to participate in anti-government activities, forcing the opposition to adapt its contentious repertoire in response. When digital surveillance systems start being implemented in a city, it is expected that targeted repression will increase and mass gatherings will decrease and be replaced by spontaneous disruptive performances. However, when the density of these systems in a city are high enough and effectively capable of monitoring all citizens’ movements and activities, they will deter any opposition activity, leading to a reduction of any form of anti-government political participation and state repression. To test these arguments, I use public procurement data and government documents to analyze the impact of the digital surveillance program “Safe City” in Russia on anti-government activities and targeted repression in 180 cities from 2011 to 2021.