How do opportunities for future career advancement shape the current behavior of political elites? Scholars have long argued that political elites are highly strategic, particularly in making decisions about ambition for offices beyond their current position. But how do shifting opportunities for political advancement shape legislators' behavior in their current offices? We argue that legislators adjust their behavior as institutional reforms change their prospects. Focusing on Argentina and women’s limited opportunities to compete for political office, we leverage an uneven roll out of provincial-level gender quotas; as subnational careers often follow national service in Argentina, these quotas changed the opportunities available to women in the national legislature in the next stage of their career. We expect that, absent gender quotas, men in the national legislature will be more likely than women to introduce legislation targeting local jurisdictions, a common credit-claiming strategy for national legislators who might want a future subnational position. The introduction of gender quotas at the provincial legislature levels the playing field by increasing the chances that women in the national legislature can continue their political careers in their home districts. Consequently, once provincial gender quotas are in place, the gender gap in local credit-claiming legislation disappears. Our work speaks to the ways in which institutional changes can shape the behavior of a wide set of political elites and the strategic behavior of those in political office.