How do trade relationships with authoritarian countries shape governments’ preferences for digital repression? Recent research links Chinese exports of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to greater use of digital repressive tactics, such as internet shutdowns. Chinese technology is often dual-use, supporting both infrastructure development and state control over digital communication. However, the repertoire of digital repression tactics is broad, ranging from targeted surveillance to indiscriminate internet shutdowns, with significant differences in economic cost: internet shutdowns disrupt business, while content takedowns or spyware usage are less costly. Thus, acquiring potentially repressive technologies alone does not fully explain their use.

We argue that importing ICTs from China is necessary but insufficient for employing digital repression tactics. Trade relationships influence both the availability and deployment of tactics. Specifically, two types of trade relationships explain variation in governments’ use of digital repression. Homogeneous cross-border trade with neighboring autocracies—focused on raw materials—is unaffected by the costs of indiscriminate repression and does not incentivize cost-sensitive tactics. In contrast, heterogeneous trade with China—importing internet-reliant technology in exchange for raw and manufactured goods—discourages costly repression like internet shutdowns while encouraging subtler tactics.

To test this argument, we construct a dataset covering African states (2014–2023) with variables capturing tech imports, trade complexity, and different digital repression tactics. Preliminary results show imports from China reduce internet shutdowns but increase less costly tactics like spyware usage. This effect is absent in trade with neighboring autocracies. Leveraging frameworks from international political economy, this research contributes to understanding external drivers of digital authoritarianism.