How do autocrats integrate into global markets while minimizing the potential for the spillover of liberal norms or institutions? We argue that autocracies have turned to place-based policies like special economic zones (SEZs), which allow autocrats to cultivate a credible, self-enforcing production ecosystem, thereby rendering broad-based, liberal institutions less relevant to foreign firms. We present a new dataset covering the establishment and design of over 4,000 special economic zones across 172 countries, as well as the domestic laws governing such zones. We investigate the diffusion of zones both globally and through a case study of Uganda, an electoral autocracy that has invested heavily in expanding international trade and investment through free zones. Globally, we find that autocracies tend to have more SEZs than democracies. Consistent with our cross-national results, we find that electoral support for the Ugandan incumbent president increases in communities near recently established zones relative to communities near soon-to-be established zones. Survey respondents closer to zones also report high levels of personal economic well-being and economic optimism. Our paper helps shed light on the increasing irrelevance of broad-based liberal democratic institutions for global commerce.