Taxation has long been central to political conflict, encapsulated by the rallying cry of “no taxation without representation.” Yet, in today’s advanced democracies, how well do tax policies reflect public preferences, particularly in an era of stark economic inequality? This paper addresses a critical but underexplored question: to what extent do modern tax systems represent the preferences of citizens across income groups? Using a novel cross-national analysis of top marginal income tax rates in 20 democracies since the 1980s, this study reveals that tax policy aligns most closely with middle-class preferences, contrary to conventional narratives of elite dominance. However, it also uncovers significant informational asymmetries that skew the responsiveness of policies. Wealthier individuals, better equipped to understand complex tax policies, have preferences that adapt more dynamically to policy changes. In contrast, the less informed, often lower-income groups, are systematically underrepresented in tax outcomes. A deeper dive into tax schedules in the United States and the United Kingdom underscores the pivotal role of the middle class in shaping tax policies, while also spotlighting stark deviations in areas like capital gains taxation. These findings challenge prevailing theories about elite control, highlighting the nuanced dynamics of political representation in fiscal policymaking. By illuminating how inequality and public opinion interact in the realm of taxation, this paper contributes to our understanding of democratic responsiveness in the modern era. It offers critical insights into the mechanisms by which governments balance representation, fairness, and economic efficiency in tax policy design.