In many developing countries, the executive controls judicial assignments. Under conditions of strong accountability, we hypothesize that this can lead to frequent transfers of judges. Transfers can cause judge vacancies and increase the hearings needed to resolve cases. For both reasons, cases that experience transfers are less likely to be resolved in a time-bound manner.

We test our theory by leveraging detailed microdata from Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest state. An analysis of the resumes of over 3000 judges in the state’s lower judiciary confirms that transfers are indeed frequent: judges are typically transferred across positions every 11 months, and across districts every three years.

Transfers have large ramifications on the judicial system. An analysis of the progression of over 10 million cases filed between 2010 and 2018 suggests that transfers decrease judge productivity, as measured by the number of decisions issued. Cases that experience transfers are less likely to be decided quickly. Consistent with the theory, these cases are also more likely to be temporarily “orphaned” due to court vacancies and experience more hearings.

Around transfers, judges are more likely to resolve recently filed and relatively easy cases. Rules and planning can limit the costs of transfers. Bail cases—which must be decided quickly—are less likely to be affected by transfers, and transfers that occur at regularly scheduled times are less detrimental to court productivity. The paper concludes with a discussion of policy implications.