Voting is the most fundamental act of political participation in a democracy, as well as the main mechanism for holding officials accountable. The accuracy of voter lists -– the extent to which all eligible adults are enrolled to vote and all ineligible individuals are deleted from the list -– therefore is an indicator of the health of a democracy. While under-enrollment and the extent of “deadwood” on voter lists have come under considerable scrutiny in the United States, the accuracy of electoral rolls in developing countries has not attracted the same scholarly attention so far. I examine the quality of the electoral roll in India, the world’s largest democracy, using original data from two full village censuses and a large-scale voter survey. I find that voter lists simultaneously show under-enrollment – that is the disenfranchisement of eligible adults – as well as deadwood; and that the deadwood masks part of the under-enrollment. This pattern is starkest for women, particularly young women, who are most likely to migrate in India and often dependent on family support for their voter registration. The reason for the poor quality of voter lists, I argue, lies in the incentive structure for low-level officers in charge of maintaining the decentralized rolls.