Organisational Density and Social Policy: How Informal Workers’ Organisations Impact Resource Allocation and Policy Preferences
P5-S118-3
Presented by: Federico Fuchs
Under what conditions can labour market outsiders influence social policy? Why are some organisations more successful than others at securing benefits for their members? This paper addresses these questions by examining how informal workers’ organisations collectively impact the geographic distribution of income support benefits targeted at lower-income sectors.
It argues that informal workers’ collective action shapes the distribution of social policy benefits at both the local level and, within districts, among organisations. Organisational density is the key factor explaining the distribution of benefits towards low-income groups, particularly when organisations are aligned with the governing party responsible for resource allocation. Organisations with greater mobilising capacity and larger structures are better positioned to negotiate with governments, thereby capturing a larger share of benefits. Moreover, the paper demonstrates that organisational mediation of policy benefits extends beyond those directly engaged in collective action, influencing social policy preferences and electoral outcomes at the local level.
To support this argument, the paper draws on a diverse array of data sources, including a census of beneficiaries of a core workfare program in Argentina with unique individual-level information on over 90,000 beneficiaries, data on over 140 organisations, the national population census, precinct-level electoral results, and geo-localised survey data. Through quasi-experimental and observational analyses, the findings reveal the impact of organisational density on resource allocation both between and within districts, as well as the association of these patterns with electoral support for incumbents and social policy preferences.
It argues that informal workers’ collective action shapes the distribution of social policy benefits at both the local level and, within districts, among organisations. Organisational density is the key factor explaining the distribution of benefits towards low-income groups, particularly when organisations are aligned with the governing party responsible for resource allocation. Organisations with greater mobilising capacity and larger structures are better positioned to negotiate with governments, thereby capturing a larger share of benefits. Moreover, the paper demonstrates that organisational mediation of policy benefits extends beyond those directly engaged in collective action, influencing social policy preferences and electoral outcomes at the local level.
To support this argument, the paper draws on a diverse array of data sources, including a census of beneficiaries of a core workfare program in Argentina with unique individual-level information on over 90,000 beneficiaries, data on over 140 organisations, the national population census, precinct-level electoral results, and geo-localised survey data. Through quasi-experimental and observational analyses, the findings reveal the impact of organisational density on resource allocation both between and within districts, as well as the association of these patterns with electoral support for incumbents and social policy preferences.
Keywords: Social Policy, Informal Workers, Collective Action