Corruption scandals have been considered one of the types of political crises that can lead to the rise of populism. The Manichean division of populism, in which the people are defined as pure and the elite as corrupt, as well as the anti-elitism, can be boosted by scandals in which the latter group is not only allegedly corrupt but factually. However, little is known about the effect of political responses to corruption scandals, especially when relating to populism. In 2018 the Spanish People’s Party was in government and was convicted of corruption. As a response, the main opposition party presented a no-confidence vote in Parliament, which overthrew the government. Taking advantage of the coincidence of those events with the data collection of a survey, I explore the effects of changes in government on populist attitudes using an experimental design. Do changes in government lead to the reduction of populism at the individual level? If so, is this effect present for both winners and losers of the change in government? Does institutional trust play a role in this relationship? This paper responds to these questions, showing the importance of institutional trust in reducing the demand for populism. Additionally, it speaks to the broader debate about the mechanisms liberal democracies have for responding to crises and palliating their effect on the rise of populism.