In an increasingly globalized world, governments are striving to support domestic firms in their pursuit of international markets. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) offer benefits such as reduced tariffs and harmonized standards, but they fall short in helping com- panies identify potential trade partners or providing practicable solutions for conflicts with these partners. This study explores how two bureaucracies – embassies led by ambassadors and export credit agencies (ECAs)– can assist companies in such scenar- ios. Ambassadors offer political connections, while ECAs provide financial instruments to mitigate risk. However, the interaction between these governmental efforts remains underexplored. Specifically, how do the political influence of ambassadors and the fi- nancial mechanisms of ECAs complement each other? We argue that these agencies may function synergistically, with one compensating for the other’s shortcomings. To test this hypothesis, we analyze novel data from two U.S. bureaucracies: the diplomatic corps and the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank. Our analysis of detailed deal-level data reveals that the EXIM Bank is more likely to approve support for private firms en- gaging in international trade when diplomatic influence declines. This paper enhances our understanding of the public sector’s role in facilitating private sector engagement in global markets.