Crises open windows of opportunity for interest groups to influence policy outcomes, but not if their access to policymakers is limited. Building on theories of policy change and regulatory capture, this research investigates dynamics of regulatory self-shielding in response to policy shocks. I define self-shielding as regulators insulating their policy decisions from external influence by limiting certain interest groups’ access to them. Focusing on the European Commission’s short- and long-term response to the 2022 energy crisis, I explore both changes in the composition of the energy policy community and interest groups’ preference attainment. I argue that, based on the nature of the policy response (urgent or structural) the Commission maintained relatively closer engagement with interest groups with an established relationship with the Commission, while limiting the access of new interest groups. Similarly, when policy change is dictated by a crisis, interest groups’ lobbying efforts and expenditures yield diminishing returns on access and preference attainment due to regulators’ efforts to shield decision-making. I explore changes in the constellation of the policy community and lobbying success before and after the March 2022 crisis. I use EU Transparency Register’s historical data and interest group’s position papers on five crisis-response emergency measures, the "RePower EU Plan", and the reform of the EU electricity market. While trends in lobbying data reveal an unprecedented increase in the energy industry’s EU lobbying since 2022, preliminary statistical findings paradoxically indicate that greater lobbying traffic is associated with restricted access to policymakers and diminished overall prospects of regulatory capture.