Virtually every autocracy is governed with the help of a ruling party. However, why are some authoritarian ruling parties more entrenched in society than others? In this paper, we argue that increasing the size of authoritarian ruling parties requires stable national elites – i.e., members of the parliament (MPs) – who can invest in party-building efforts without the threat of being replaced by the leader. However, authoritarian ruling party-building strategies present a challenging trade-off between creating or expanding new network and maintaining them through redistribution practices. More stable national elites allow for the creation of extended networks, yet larger authoritarian ruling parties also require heavier investments in returns to membership. Although increasing the size of an authoritarian ruling party brings stronger organizational capacity, it also facilitates the development of clientelist ties. To test this theory, we compile and use novel data on legislative retention rates and ruling parties’ size in 20 autocracies between 1921 and 2020. Implementing hierarchical and linear models, we show that higher retention rates have a positive effect on party size whilst more expansive party-building under high retention rates is also associated with higher levels of clientelism. Furthermore, we use Vietnam as a case study to test the internal validity of the argument by geolocating every party office of the ruling party, matching these with MPs' place of origin, and testing these effects on sub-national clientelistic levels using readily available survey data between 2011-2023. Ultimately, these results present new implications for the authoritarian political strength-economic performance nexus.