Recent advances in the fiscal contract literature have shifted the focus to individual-level data and yielded novel insights regarding its micro-foundations. They suggest that the often-found positive relationship between taxation and accountability may be driven by something that is not inherent to taxation and can thus be manipulated: individuals’ feelings of ownership over the budget and/or information regarding its size. We contribute to this literature by conducting a survey-based field experiment among 1,950 respondents in Peruvian districts benefiting from mining fees. Our experiment manipulates both the source of revenues (local taxes vs resource rents) and the level of ownership over the budget, while keeping its size constant. This allows us to disentangle the effects of information from those of ownership. We report multiple findings: citizens feel higher levels of ownership over tax revenues than resource rents, but low tax awareness limits the extent of ownership over tax revenues; ownership over tax revenues has a positive effect on willingness to monitor local governments but does not affect behaviors; and the source of revenues matters for the type of accountability that is demanded, with tax revenues associated with more particularistic demands than resource rents.