How does the strategic behavior of political parties influence partisans’ democratic satisfaction? Extant work predicts that partisans who win elections are more likely to be satisfied with democracy than partisans who lose elections. Yet, little is known about how the strategic pre-electoral cooperation between political parties influence partisans’ democratic satisfaction. By leveraging the strategic cooperation of the center and left political parties against the far right in the second-round of 2024 French legislative elections, we argue that party signals of cooperation and democratic commitment at the district level attenuate the negative effects of losing elections on democratic satisfaction. By comparing across districts won by a leftist candidate, we expect centrist partisans to be more satisfied with democracy in districts in which the centrist candidate coordinated with the left against the far right than in districts in which the centrist candidate competed against the left and the far right. We find evidence to support our expectations using a difference-in-difference estimation strategy combined with individual panel data comparing centrist partisans in near-identical districts in which centrist candidates coordinated with the left against the far right with districts in which centrist candidates competed against the left and the far right in the second round. Our results have implications for the study of party and voter compromise in the context of the strengthening of far-right parties in European democracies.