15:00 - 16:40
P4-S81
Room: -1.A.03
Chair/s:
Theodoros Ntounias
Discussant/s:
Jesus Antonio Renzullo
Strategic Choices under Public Scrutiny: Complementary Experiments Explaining Incentives in the EU-Hungary Dispute over Democratic Backsliding
P4-S81-3
Presented by: Kata Moravecz
Kata Moravecz
Central European university

In December 2023, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán lifted his veto on Ukraine’s EU accession talks, just hours after the European Commission approved the release of 10 billion euros in previously frozen EU funding. This decision reflects the ongoing EU-Hungary standoff over democratic backsliding, with Orbán’s government frequently criticized for authoritarian tendencies. While much attention focuses on Hungary’s domestic pressures and the EU’s rule of law mechanisms, the role of public opinion in shaping strategies on both sides is often overlooked.

This paper presents findings from two survey experiments exploring how public pressure influences the EU and Hungary in this dispute. A German experiment examines how public opinion shapes the EU’s response to Hungary’s use of vetoes as a bargaining tool. Participants navigate a hypothetical scenario where the EU considers sanctions following an undemocratic reform by Hungary, which retaliates with a veto on Ukraine aid. Conversely, a Hungarian experiment investigates whether public pressure encourages Orbán’s government to comply with or resist EU demands and examines voter reactions to the government’s strategic veto use.

By analyzing public opinion’s impact on these strategic decisions, this study sheds light on the broader dynamics of democratic backsliding in the EU. It highlights how public pressure creates incentives for both the EU and Hungary, offering a novel perspective on the interplay between governance, rule of law, and public engagement in EU politics.
Keywords: European Union, survey experiment, public opinion, democratic backsliding

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