This paper explores the conditions under which autocratic regimes choose to share power, focusing on the incentives and constraints that shape these decisions. While autocrats typically share power to strengthen their coalition of support and ensure long-term stability, this strategy also carries risks of diminished centralized control. We argue that autocrats are more likely to share power when the potential costs of defection are minimal and the risks of losing control are lower. To test this theory, we collect historical data from archives on the appointment of mayors following Spain’s 1948 reform of local power organization under the Francoist dictatorship. This reform marked a pivotal moment in the regime’s efforts to consolidate its rule by redistributing power among local coalition members following the chaotic postwar power arrangements. Our analysis leverages an information shock from the 1947 auscultación municipal, which revealed previously imperfect information about the proportion of regime supporters and opponents in each municipality. Using difference-in-differences and cross-sectional models, we test the hypothesis that power-sharing, reflected in the appointment of mayors who were not part of the ruler’s core group, was more likely in “safe” municipalities —those with a higher concentration of regime supporters. Findings suggest that Franco’s regime strategically shared power in such contexts to broaden its coalition while mitigating risks. This study sheds light on the trade-offs inherent in autocratic power-sharing strategies and offers insights into how autocrats consolidate power in the aftermath of their rise to power.