13:10 - 14:50
P3-S63
Room: 0A.03
Chair/s:
Peter Schram
Discussant/s:
Peter Schram
Interest Group Influence on Policy Proposals and Passage
P3-S63-4
Presented by: Roel Bos
Roel Bos
Princeton University
Interest groups can influence policy outcomes by shaping the content of policy proposals and by affecting whether proposals become law. How and when do groups engage in either or both of these stages of the policy process? And how does potential opposition from other groups affect participation patterns? I study a two-stage policymaking model in which a proposing legislator either accepts an aligned interest group's proposal or puts forward their own (costly) proposal. Given a proposal, the aligned and a misaligned interest group engage in an all-pay contest over whether the proposal is implemented or the status quo stays in place. I show an aligned group anticipating relatively weak opposition chooses to author the proposal, while a group anticipating strong opposition leaves proposing to the legislator. As a result, when the equilibrium proposal comes from the group, the probability it survives the implementation stage is high, while if the proposal comes from the legislator, the probability it survives is typically low. The model provides a novel, selection-based explanation consistent with empirical patterns of interest group involvement in policymaking.
Keywords: Formal Theory, Interest Group Politics, Legislative Policymaking

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