This work investigates the effects of quotas, a policy frequently employed as a means of countering discrimination in (among others) hiring decisions. Most observed quota policies are uni-dimensional – i.e., defined to ensure a minimum representation of individuals with a specific trait in the set of hired candidates. Considering that in many situations, there are multiple social categories exposed to discrimination, this project asks whether a uni-dimensional quota protecting one characteristic has an effect on the success probability of individuals with another non-protected characteristic. To the degree that employers perceive different dimensions to contribute to a team’s diversity as (imperfect) substitutes, we expect the uni-dimensional quota to have a negative effect on the number of hired candidates with the other (unprotected) trait. Conversely, to the degree that the uni-dimensional quota policy communicates the shift in norm on inclusiveness defined more broadly (i.e., increases the weight of signaling socially desirable behavior for the employer), it can be expected to have a positive effect on the success rate of the other dimension. We employ the setting of a hiring experiment where participants hire a team from a pool of candidates who are either male or female and either from the native majority or from a racial (or immigrant) minority. Participants are incentivized to hire candidates with the highest productivity. We exogenously vary whether employers have to respect a gender quota in their decisions and observe whether this variation has an impact on racial minority candidates being hired (both males and females).