How did enslavers maintain a system that violently extracted labor out of unwilling participants? In previous work, I model two ways that enslavers discouraged laborers' escape - ex ante incentives and ex post pursuit. There, enslavers choose how much to invest in pursuing runaways, but the level of plantation incentives are exogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Now, I extend that model by endogenizing incentives: enslavers also choose how to incentivize productivity on the plantation.

Preliminary results indicate that enslavers may allocate their resources across both plantation incentives and pursuit: instead of offering more plantation incentives to prevent escape altogether, they spend some resources on incentives and some on pursuing highly-skilled laborers who escape. The model also shows that enslavers' investments in incentives on the plantation do not strictly deter protest. Instead, the highest levels of plantation incentives are coincident with running, not with staying. Finally, I find that, under some conditions, increases in the profitability of plantation agriculture are associated with lower production of said agriculture. The law of supply does not hold, and it is because protest by the enslaved mediated the effect of external economic conditions on enslavers' profits. As such, the model affirms the power of enslaved laborers to affect economic outcomes on antebellum plantations.