Civil society engagement is often assumed to strengthen accountability. Yet evidence from developing countries documents that civil society organizations (CSOs) do not only demand rights and better government services, but also targeted goods, sometimes in exchange for political support, and that CSOs often employ informal tactics rather than institutionalized forms of political participation. The choice of tactics and demands that CSOs use is, we argue, based on an assessment of how to best serve the interests of their members and leaders in relation to the institutional context in which they are active. Where government operations follow a logic of favoritism, leveraging connections may seem the more rational method to advance claims; particularistic and even clientelistic demand-making are likely to be more prevalent; and informal tactics the preferred choice. We test these arguments employing vignette experiments embedded in a face-to-face survey of 2400 associational leaders in Peru (fielded in January 2025), a context with high levels of civil society engagement, but relatively weak institutions. The vignettes present hypothetical scenarios in which a leader ask for advice on how best to go about helping the organization. We manipulate the degree of partiality and favoritism employing two institutional characteristics: corruption levels and the degree of political control over staffing in the local administration. We thus examine the political behavioral implications of partiality in the exercise of government power. The paper enhances our understanding of how the functioning of public administration influences political behavior, highlighting the mutually reinforcing dynamics that hinder institutional development.