I study electoral and regulatory distortions that emerge when firms influence voters' pocketbooks. Since regulation affects profit, business activities are politically informative and enable firms to strategically manipulate voters' political preferences. In response, incumbents regulate to induce business activities that maximize their reelection prospects. When firms and voters are aligned in regulatory preferences, incumbents always concede to create favorable regulatory environments for firms, leading to over-investment in equilibrium. When firms and voters are misaligned, incumbents concede to firms when voters' pocketbook concerns weigh heavily but crowd out investments when voters prioritize regulation. Voters and firms benefit when they are aligned. Voters may benefit even when they are misaligned with firms, though such firms may incur opportunity costs of under-investment. Economic and political distortions caused by pocketbook voting need not be bad for voters nor good for firms, but incumbents always become more likely to be reelected.