This project examines the impact of perceptions about the quality of government on support for state-sponsored redistribution. While existing scholarship has identified a number of factors that shape welfare state attitudes, individual evaluations of institutional quality have received relatively little attention. I seek to address this gap by studying the way in which exposure to information about institutional inefficiency affects views on the role of the state in alleviating socio-economic inequality. To do this, I rely on two empirical strategies. I begin by leveraging a natural experiment in Denmark where a public servant was arrested for corruption and embezzlement of especially large proportions. I proceed to run an original priming experiment in the United Kingdom. Drawing on an audit report by the Department of Work and Pensions, I inform participants of the amount of fund misallocation within the Universal Credit system and ask them about their support for different welfare, social investment, and market intervention policies. This multi-stage empirical approach allows me to explore whether perceptions about corruption and institutional quality are correlated with welfare state attitudes and how respondents' support for state-sponsored redistribution changes in response to their being primed to think about the quality of the institutional apparatus and the cleanliness of the bureaucratic service in their country.