Territorial control, the use of violence, economic extraction, and the provision of public goods are at the heart of theories of armed actor governance, yet their systematic empirical testing remains limited and findings are mixed. Using an expert survey gathering information from hundreds of local security experts in Colombia, this study provides unprecedented levels of granularity by analyzing a variety of armed actors---including paramilitary groups, crime syndicates, and insurgent organizations---and disaggregating different types of governance behaviors. By combining causal identification research design and LOWESS model predictions, the statistical analysis evaluates the disruptive effects that state armed forces have on the provision of governance by different types of non-state armed actors. Results show that state repression generates heterogeneous effects on the levels of territorial control, the use of violence, taxation, and public goods provision for insurgents, criminal organizations, and paramilitary groups. These findings challenge some of the central pillars of armed governance theories and open new lines of inquiry.