This study examines the application of audience costs in autocratic China, with a particular focus on the often-overlooked Type II audience costs—public disapproval that arises when leaders escalate conflicts after pledging restraint. While Type I audience costs, linked to unfulfilled threats, have been previously explored in China, this research uniquely addresses the dynamics of Type II costs within an authoritarian context. We employ a survey experiment involving eight conditions, presenting Chinese respondents with scenarios of territorial disputes that vary in the government’s initial commitments, subsequent actions, and justificatory rhetoric. We hypothesize that inconsistencies, whether from failed threats or unexpected escalation, will provoke public disapproval, with special attention to the underexplored Type II costs. Additionally, we investigate whether specific rhetorical strategies can mitigate these audience costs. For Type I scenarios, we test justifications centered on “prioritizing broader interests” and “avoiding strategic traps.” In Type II scenarios, we assess the effectiveness of rhetoric emphasizing “foreign entanglement” and “betrayal of trust,” derived from prevalent Chinese diplomatic discourse. Our findings contribute to the literature by extending the concept of audience costs to non-democratic settings and illuminating how autocratic leaders may leverage rhetoric to manage public opinion in foreign policy. This research provides a nuanced perspective on the interaction between public sentiment and decision-making in Chinese foreign policy.