Do states benefit from having their nationals on the staff of international organizations (IOs) and, if so, how? We know that states seek to get their nationals hired into senior positions at IOs, but the reasons behind this are less well-understood. In addition, we know much less about attempts by member states to place their nationals in staff-level positions in IOs. I show that the policy preferences of IOs are more similar to those countries that have many of their nationals employed at the IO. In addition, I find that not all countries have an equal ability to get their nationals hired by IOs. Examining an original dataset on UN staff nationalities, I show that major donors to voluntarily-funded UN development agencies have a larger number of their nationals on staff than do similar non-major donors. I further demonstrate that those agencies' aid portfolios look more similar to countries that have a large number of their nationals on the agency's staff. Interestingly, this effect is not solely driven by those countries that existing theories of informal influence would lead us to believe should be most influential---namely the G5---but also by other, less powerful, bilateral donors. This suggests that a much larger number of countries can informally influence IOs than is generally thought.