How do autocratic regimes regulate clientelism during their consolidation? What are the impacts of their regulations on regime stability? This paper investigates the -overlooked- role of clientelistic institutions and their regulation during regime transitions towards autocratic rule. During autocratization, the opposition could utilize its clientelistic networks to mobilize against the new regime. To inhibit the opposition, the emerging regime might pursue a monopoly over the provision of clientelistic services by restricting non-state providers of clientelism. I argue that these discriminatory restrictions would boost the opposition's mobilization in the early phase of the transition, but this effect would dissipate and shift in favor of the regime as it consolidates power. I relate these changes to the regulations' informational functions. Empirically, I test this argument using an original district-level dataset of Islamist charities (i.e., clientelistic institutions) in Egypt (2012-2015) during its regime transition. The findings show that the new regime's crackdown on Islamist charities boosted pro-Islamist (anti-transition) mobilization during the transition's early phase. However, these effects disappeared with the regime's consolidation. Even more, dismantling the opposition's clientelistic machine enabled the regime to coopt their clients and shift their loyalties toward the new regime. Thus, the pursuit of clientelistic monopolies might backfire in the short term, but stabilize the new regime in the medium/long term.