Ideological biases and preferences on electoral rules. Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Spain.
P2-S48-1
Presented by: Jaime Bordel Gil
The literature on electoral systems has focused mainly on the elites' preferences devoting little attention to studying what people think about electoral rules. The present paper seeks to contribute to this understudied branch of the literature by analysing to what extent political and territorial preferences determine citizens' attitudes towards the electoral system. I argue that people do not have clear preferences about the electoral rules and that their ideological and territorial biases will condition their satisfaction towards the electoral system. To test this argument, I conduct a vignette-survey-experiment in Spain (n=3010) where I manipulate the information given to respondents through different treatments. The experiment treatments show different information indicating that the electoral system disadvantages certain parties or territories. The results show that having a right-wing ideology has a negative effect on satisfaction with the electoral system. However, this effect turns positive when people are informed that left-wing parties such as Sumar or territories such as Barcelona are disadvantaged. On the other hand, effects remain negative but do not increase when is reported that Madrid is disadvantaged compared to pro-independence territories such as Lleida or that the far-right party Vox is disadvantaged. These findings confirm our expectations. People’s preferences towards the electoral system are inconsistent and strongly conditioned by ideology and territorial preferences, especially among right-wing voters.
Keywords: Electoral system. Ideology. Territorial preferences. Vignette Experiment.