What can enhance the diffusion of repression between autocracies? Existing research does not provide a clear answer to this question, suggesting that it could be geographical proximity or similarity of political institutions. These are classical approaches to study of any diffusion. In this paper, I argue that one of the important determinants of the repression diffusion is the existence of linkages between autocracies. Authoritarian linkages may reduce the costs of finding effective repressive strategies, by providing fast and broad communication channels between states. In that case, dictators do not need to develop native toolkits. For instance, membership in international organizations or military alliances can facilitate diffusion by providing more opportunities for interagency cooperation and information sharing. This cooperation enables autocrats to collaborate with different autocracies, not just with neighboring countries or regimes with similar institutional structures as suggested in existing research. Another example is trade, if much of the state revenue depends on trade with other autocracies, elites will be interested in maintaining the status quo in trading partner countries, which can enhance the learning process and direct support of repression apparatus in partner country. I test these propositions based on data on bilateral trade, military and trade alliances, joint military exercises, and other indicators of authoritarian linkages. Quantitative analysis with different specifications of the dependent variable (which is based on Political Terror Scale and Mass Mobilization in Autocracy databases) shows strong support for the theory and takes another step towards understanding the mechanisms of the spread of repressive practices.