Do democracies use the law to repress? In this paper, I identify three plausible reasons why democracies take recourse to the law to increase their coercive powers. First, as a socialized act of democratic norms and liberal ideals that believe in the rule of law. The belief that laws matter means that legal legitimacy is required to enact coercion within a state’s boundaries. Second, as a means of upholding their commitments to international human rights laws. Unlawful repression could trigger backlash from an international audience. Third, as a shield to sustain their democratic credentials while being able to use force with impunity. Laws can serve as a signal of a deliberative democratic process even if the content of the laws are undemocratic. I leverage unique archival data on India’s counterinsurgency law to test these mechanisms. Specifically, the ministerial files on the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) and the parliamentary debates around them. I show how the Indian state selectively picks colonial-era laws to enact repression. Through process tracing, I find strong evidence for centralizing and increasing the repressive power of the state while not wanting to appear overtly authoritarian.