Electoral fate of party switchers
P2-S38-1
Presented by: Raimondas Ibenskas
Party switching by members of parliament (MPs) is common in most younger democracies and is on the rise in established democracies. This study examines the re-election prospects of switchers. Switching is widely seen as a betrayal of voters’ trust that should be punished at the ballot box, but the existing evidence is mixed. While many studies find that switching reduces the re-election chances of MPs, others suggest that some forms of switching are less electorally damaging or even potentially beneficial. We examine how the electoral consequences vary depending on the destination of switching: (a) another existing parliamentary party group (defection), (b) a return to the fold (re-entry), (c) a new party group (split), or (d) parliamentary independence (exit). We expect the defectors and re-entrants to suffer the least because recipient parties, knowing that in-switchers can bring them additional votes, provide in-switchers with electable candidacies. MPs involved in splits become the splinter parties’ leading candidates whose re-election hinges on their party’s electoral performance. Exits usually lead to the severing of ties with all parties and may be the most damaging to re-election chances, unless an electoral system allows for the success of individual candidates (Ireland) or where exit is the only form of legislative switching allowed (Estonia). We test these expectations with a new dataset covering more than 1,000 switchers in eight European democracies: Estonia, Lithuania, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Romania.
Keywords: Legislative party switching, Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, re-election