Previous research has established the motivations that parties might have in blurring their positions or presenting a fuzzy agenda, often for electoral or office-seeking reasons. Yet once in office, we make the argument that governments also might face motivations for presenting a non-specific agenda. We argue that there are institutional veto player and commitment mechanisms (such as coalition majority status, a coalition agreement, and government ideological division) that might lead governments to insert blurred statements of their priorities. We evaluate the effects of these variables based on a hand-coding of the socio-economic content of government declarations from 13 Western European countries from 1979 to 2017. These declarations lay out the priorities that a new government will seek to address in the coming years. First we discuss descriptively the number of statements that are specific in government intentions (such as rising corporate tax rate by 3%) versus those that provide greater room for the government to later maneuver (such as promising to reform corporate taxation rates). We find that governments with ideological divisions tend to be more specific in their declarations, while minority governments tend towards less specificity in their declarations. Our conclusions expand the idea of position blurring or fuzziness from the party level to the government level.