When and why do democratic institutions fail to protect vulnerable citizens from exploitation and violence? I add to existing explanations -- which primarily characterize uneven state enforcement as benevolent -- by detailing how states may rely on a logic of non-enforcement which is primarily coercive. In particular, I suggest that selective enforcement of its own policies allows states to aid third-party allies in their exploitation of law-breaking populations. I illustrate this logic in the case of Lagos, Nigeria which recently began enforcement on a ban of the state's popular and omnipresent motorcycle taxis. I exploit a unique feature of the governor's enforcement announcement, which delineated where the government intended to actively enforce. I show -- using observational evidence from several months of fieldwork and local newspaper archives; as well as original geo-coded datasets of enforcement locations, exploitation points, traffic incidents, and informal transport density -- how the state's decision to pass, but incompletely enforce, a ban on informal transit in Lagos was made in order to aid the exploitation of transport operators by powerful transport unions, on which the Lagos state government relies for electoral violence. In particular, I show that the political geography of the ban's enforcement serves to displace riders into areas controlled by the union; and exploit the timing of a surprising election result to show how a shock to state reliance on the union is followed by a change in enforcement patterns.