In recent years, political parties have developed sophisticated electoral campaigns that use large databases of personal information to identify people's political preferences. This raises questions about how having more information about the public's political affiliations affects parties' allocation of campaign resources during elections. Using a game-theoretic model, we explore how this impacts electoral competition between two parties, assuming they allocate resources strategically between mobilizing partisan supporters and persuading independent voters. We find that when parties have more accurate information about citizens' political affinities, they reduce resources allocated to persuading independent voters compared to mobilizing partisan supporters. This leads to a more polarized voting population during elections, especially with larger campaign budgets and fewer undecided voters. Additionally, increased political competition can reverse these effects, indicating that systems with fewer parties are more susceptible to such polarization results. This framework enhances our understanding of campaign communication and targeting strategies in the digital age, with institutional design implications for how limiting voter surveillance can reduce the polarization of the voting public.