How strategic are party members when voting for party leaders? Evidence from a conjoint experiment
P1-S24-2
Presented by: Hugo Ferrinho Lopes
To what extent are party members willing to trade off policy preferences for electoral gains in their leadership preferences? In most democracies, party members hold a monopoly over leader selection. However, the factors driving their vote choices remain largely unexplored, and the lack of experimental evidence prevents causal claims. Party members are often taken as more ideologically extreme than party voters and leaders. Recent evidence shows that youth wing members are even more extreme. Given this, do they vote for ideologically extreme leaders, or are they willing to compromise on policy to reach office? While policy, office, and votes are key goals for parties, the relative importance of each remains uncertain. Leveraging a conjoint survey experiment of Portuguese party members (n=3500), I examine whether and why party members prioritize policy agreement over electability in leadership contests. The results show that members are not willing to trade off policy preferences for electoral gains, and that youth wing members are even more ideological than their older counterparts. These findings have broad implications for the literature on political representation, voting behavior, party leadership and candidate selection, the personalization of politics, intra-party democracy, and the growing study of party youth wings.
Keywords: party leadership, party members, voting behavior, youth wings, political parties, conjoint experiment.