This paper develops a spatial model in which two parties compete using both programmatic as well as clientelist appeals to voters. In the model parties strategically choose: (1) their spatial policy position, (2) their division of scarce effort between the promotion of this spatial position and clientelist targeting, and (3) the set of voters who are targeted to receive clientelist benefits. In the baseline model the presence of clientelist appeals leads either to Downsian convergence or to an infinite cycle. The results are more nuanced when adding: a.) the possibility of abstention, and b.) reasonable restrictions to the subset of voters which parties can target with clientelist goods. With these additional elements, I find that the relationship between clientelism and ideological polarization should be curvilinear: ideological moderation should accompany equilibria with both very high and very low levels of clientelist effort, while ideological polarization should characterize equilibria at intermediate levels of clientelist effort. I also find that clientelist goods will be targeted diffusely to broad constituencies when spatial platforms are moderate; but will be narrowly targeted to pivotal (centrist) voters when spatial platforms polarize.