A fundamental assumption underpinning most work on modern state formation and consolidation is that increased state capacity and institutionalization go hand-in-hand with greater predictability and legibility. We argue that these assumptions fail to adequately consider what we call ambiguity politics, a form of governance in which vagueness and lack of clarity may be useful and even functionally necessary for state-building elites and bureaucrats. Building on both existing literature and our observations in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, we propose a typology that maps the nature of ambiguity politics according to the level of analysis (micro/macro) at which political actors use or encounter ambiguity and the motivation that drives this ambiguity (strategic/accidental). We show that the logics underlying ambiguity politics are particularly pronounced in conflict and post-conflict settings, where power relations and domains of jurisdiction are being vigorously negotiated and contested. The early days of the post-2021 Taliban regime therefore provide us with a unique opportunity to observe processes and behaviors that usually remain invisible and shed light on bureaucratic politics more broadly. Yet, we show that these logics exist and persist in most institutional contexts. Hence, our typology explains seemingly irrational or incoherent administrative practices and decisions in a large variety of settings and provides the basis for more systematic comparative analyses of ambiguity politics.